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300 CBOsswmTE v. AMERICAN INSURANCE Co. [61 C.2d 
[So F. No. 21632. In Bank. May 14, 1964.] 
IJOUIS CROSSWHITE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. THE 
AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant and 
Respondent. 
[la, Ib] Cla.im and Delivery-Liability on Undertaking.-In an 
action against a surety company on a claim and delivery bond, 
based on the breach by the plaintiff in the action in which the 
bond was furnished of a condition in the bond that the action 
would be prosecuted, the present plaintiff could not recover 
damages other than the costs of the first action wh£'re he had 
no right to the possession of the property during the time it 
was kept from him by virtue of the claim and dt'livery pro-
cedure. 
[2] ld. - Liability on Undertaking - Evidence. - In an action 
against a surety company on a claim and delivery bond, neither 
the voluntary dismissal without prejudice of the claim and 
delivery action nor the court's order to return the mortgaged 
property to plaintiff because thc seizure was irregular conclu-
sively established plaintiff's right to possess the property dur-
ing the timc it was kept from him. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Hum-
boldt County. Donald H. Wilkinson, Judge. Affirmed. 
Action to recover on a claim and delivery bond. Judgment 
for defendant surety company affirmed. 
Jones & Sinai and James E. Jones, Jr., for Plaintiff and 
Appellant. 
Frederick L. Hilger for Defendant and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff appeals from a judgment for 
defendant surety company in an action on a claim and deliv-
erybond. 
Plaintiff acquired a logging truck knowing that it was sub·· 
ject to a chattel mortgage held by the DeBon Motor Company 
as security for a note that was in default. The mortgage 
provided that in the event of a default the mortgagee was 
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Claim and DeIiv£'ry, § 79; Am.Jur., Replevin 
(1st cd § 149). 
McK. Dig, References: [1] Claim lind Delivery, § 88; [2J Claim 
and Delivery, § 95. 
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entitled to possession and could "enter upon the premises 
where the said mortgaged property may be and take posses-
siOll thereof." Instead of attempting to take possession of 
the truck, DeBon first demanded possession and when that 
was refused brought an action against the mortgagor to 
recover the truck and also invoked the auxiliary J'emedy of 
claim and delivery. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 509-521.) Defendant 
delivered to DeBon the undertaking required to support the 
seizure of the truck by claim and delivery. At that time 
DeBon did not know that the mortgagor had sold the truck 
(the registration and certificate of ownership were not 
transferred) or that the truck had been taken out of the 
county where the mortgagor had his place of business. 
Apparently for this reason seizure of the truck was delayed, 
and plaintiff filed an answer to the complaint 15 minutes 
before the sheriff seized the truck. Section 509 of the Code· of 
Civil Procedure provides· that in an action to recover per-
sonal property the plaintiff may claim delivery of it "at any 
time before answer." The sheriff did not seize the truck 
until after the answer was filed and failed to deliver all of 
the documents required for a seizure by claim and delivery. 
Two months later the trial court ordered the truck returned. 
DeBon returned the truck and voluntarily dismissed the ac-
tion without prejudice, apparently because it did not wish to 
leave plaintiff in possession while waiting for the case to 
come to trial. DeBon filed a new action shortly thereafter, 
and delivery of the truck was properly claimed. 
The undertaking given by defendant, following the provi- . 
sions of section 512,· was conditioned on the "prosecution of 
the action. " DeBon's failure to prosecute the action 
breached this condition. (Mills v. Gleason, 21 Cal. 274, 280; 
Bucy v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 150 Cal..App.2d 572, 
574 [310 P.2d 189].) The only issue at the trial was the 
amount of plaintiff's damage, which plaintiff claimed to be 
the value of the use of the truck during the two-month period 
when DeBon had possession of it. The trial court, however, 
held that plaintiff had no right to the use of the truck during 
that period and therefore had not been damaged by its seizure. 
[1&] It is established by the admitted facts, and plaintiff 
does not deny, that DeBon was entitled to the possession of 
.Section 1112 requi~ ". written 11Ddertakillg, executed by two or 
more eufIlcient sureties ••• to the effect that the)' are bo11Dd to the 
defendant ill double the value of the property ••• for the proaeeution of 
the action .... " I 
-j 
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the truck when it was seized. The truck was subject to a 
mortgage securing an obligation that was in default. The 
mortgage expressly granted the mortgagee the right to 
possession afterdefauIt, and under its terms the mortgagee 
could have repossessed the truck without legal process, at 
least if the repossession could have been accomplished peace-
fully. (Silverstin v. Koh'ler ~ Chase, 181 Cal. 51, 54 [183 P. 
451, 9 A.L.R. 1177]; Plinn v. Perry, 127 Cal. 648, 652-653 
[60 P. 434]; Zef/ v.Harvey Smith Oldsmobile Co., 154 
Cal.App.2d 1, 4 1315 P.2d 371]; see Harper v. Gordon, 128 
Cal. 489, 491-492 [61 P. 84].) In withholding property 
subject to such a mortgage after demand, the mortgagor and 
his assigns became converters (Mathew v. Mathew, 138 Cal. 
334, 336-337 [71 P. 344]). liable not only for the property or 
its value, but also. for damages for the detention from the 
time of the demand. (Guerin v. Kirst, 33 Ca1.2d 402, 414-415 
[202 P.2d 10, 7 A.L.R.2d 922]; Spencer KenMUy, Ltd. v .. 
Bank of America, 19 Cal.2d 586, 589 [122 P.2d 522] ; Drink-
house v. Van Ness, 202 Cal. 359, 374, 379-380 [260 P. 869] ; 
Na1thas v. Browning, 181 Cal. 55, 57 [183 P. 442, 6 A.L.R. 
476]; Code Civ. Proc., §§ 667, 627; see Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 740; 10 CaI.Jur.2d, Claim and Delivery, § 70.) Plaintiff was 
therefore not only not entitled to the use of the truck during 
the two-month period it was in DeBon's possession, but could 
have been held liable for the value of its use had he retained 
it during that time. Unless defendant is precluded for some 
reason from showing its principal's right to possession, the 
trial court's decision must be affirmed. 
[2] Plaintiff contends that the judgment of dismissal 
conclusively established his right to possession. This conten-
tion is clearly without merit. A voluntary dismissal without 
prejudice before trial is not a judgment on the merits. Nor 
did the trial court's order to return the truck to plaintiff 
establish his right to possession. That order was based merely 
on the procedural irregularity in the seizure. 
[Ib] Plaintiff contends that his right to possession is 
irrelevant in an action on a claim and delivery bond. He 
contends that because there was a breach of a condition of 
the bond, he must necessarily have a right to recover 
damages. That he would have had a right to recover the costs 
of the first action', had he asked for them, is clear. To recover 
more than costs, however, he must show some other injury. 
DeBon's dismissal of the action precluded a determination 
in that action of plaintiff's right to possession. Bad DeBon 
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prosecuted the action and failed to establish its right to pos-
session, plaintiff could have recovered damages for the loss of 
use of the truck. The denial of that opportunity was the 
wrong involved here. (Mills v. Gleason, 21 Cal. 274, 280; 
Bucy v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 150 Cal.App.2d 572, 
574 [310 P.2d 189].) That wrong was rectified by giving 
plaintiff an opportunity to bring an action on the bond in 
which, if defendant could not show DeBon's right to posses-
sion, plaintiff was guaranteed satisfaction of his judgment. 
Plaintiff's recoYery on the bond is limited to the damages he 
could have recovered had the original action been decided on 
the merits in his favor. (Sec LeFave v. Dimond, 46 Ca1.2d 
868, 870-871 [299 P.2d 858, 60 A.L.R.2d 939]; Nahhas v. 
Browning, 181 Cal. 55, 57 [183 P. 442,6 A.L.R. 476].) Thus, 
in Mills v. Gleason, 21 Cal. 274, 280, the court held that" A 
dismissal stands upon the same footing as a nonsuit, leaving 
the parties to settle in an action upon the undertaking those 
matters which, if the original suit were prosecuted, it would 
be necessary to determine in the first instance. SUCII matters 
include, of course, the right of the defendant [in replevin] to 
a return of the property, and as the opportunity to obtain a 
judgment for its return is taken away by the failure to 
prosecute, he is entitled to compensation in damages. A 
failure to prosecute is a breach of the undertaking, and the 
legal and necessary result is that the sureties to the under-
taking are liable for whatever injury the defendant has 
sustained." In Tapscott v. Lyon, 103 Cal. 297, 310 [37 P. 
225], a replevisor who dismissed his action after ch~iming 
delivery of the property was held liable for damages only if 
he failed to establish his right to the property. Though tlle 
plaintiff in tbat case sued in conversion rather than on the 
bond, the basis for liability in either case is the same, and the 
court treated the remedies as interchangeable. In Bucy v. 
New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 150 Cal.App.2d 572, 574-575 
{310 P.2d 189], the court affirmed a judgment for the 
plaintiff in an action on a claim and delivery bond after 
deciding that the evidence supported the trial court's finding 
that plaintiff was entitled to possession of the property 
taken. These decisions are supported by the weight of author-
ity. (Meyers v. CJ.T. Corp. (1945) 132 Conn. 284 {43 A.2d 
742, 744] ; Holcombe ct Hoke Mfg. Co. v. Watts (1930) 91 
Ind.App. 695 [170 N.E. 861, 861-862]; Wyatt v. Duncan 
(1939) ]49 Kan. 244 [87 P.2d 233, 238]; Rowan v. State 
. (1937) 172 Md. 190 [191 A. 244, 249] ; Macomber v. Moor 
) 
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-----------------------------------------(1930) 128 Me. 481 [148A. 682, 684]; McCleUan v.1!'.A. i 
North Co. (1937) 118 N.J.L. 168 [191 A; 753, 754] ; Budracco \' 
v. National Surety Co. (1920) 112 Misc. 133 [182 N.Y.S. 590, .... 
595]; Davis Bros. Co. v. waZZace (1925) 190 N.C. 543[130 
S.E. 176, 179-180] ; Bates v. American Surety Co. (1929) 50 
R.I. 402 [148 A. 323] ; see Hoebel v. Utah-Idaho Live Stock 
Loan Co. (1924) 39 Idaho 294 [227P. 1048, 1049-1050]; i 
Maynard v. Bank of Kershaw 188 S.C. 160 [198S.E. 188, 
192-1931 ; Cobbey, Replevin (2d ed. 1900) §§ 1355, 1356, 1369, \ 
1370; Wells, Replevin (2d ed. 1907) §§ 448, 457,458.) 
Shockley v. General Casualty Co., 194 Cal.App.2d 107 [14 
Cal.Rptr. 789], which plaintiff invokes, is not relevant. It 
involved an action on an attachment bond, not a claim and 
delivery bond, and the court did not consider whether the 
defendant could assert its principal's right to possession of 
the attached property as a defense to the action. 
Since plainti1I had no right to the use of the truck when 
DeBon took it, damages based on the value of its use could 
not be justified as being compensatory. Nor has plainti1I 
alleged or proved any facts justifying a penalty. There was 
no forcible seizure, which, by analogy to the rules applicable 
to the forcible entry and detainer of real property (Code Civ. 
Proc., §§ 1159, 1160, 1174, 735; see Jordan v. Talbot, 55'\ 
Cal.2d 597 [12 Cal.Rptr. 488, 361 P.2d 20]), might justify 
. penalizing defendant. There is no suggestion of malice (ct. 
Metzenbaum v. Metzenbaum, 121 Ca1.App.2d 64 [262 P.2d 
596] ; see McCormick, Damages (1935) § 110) or of abuse of 
process. (Cf. Bille v. Manning, 94 Cal.App.2d 142 [210 P.2d 
254]; see McCormick, supra, § 109.) 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobrinet, 
J., and Peek, J., concurred. 
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